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to the medical profession to settle on a criteria that will determine the
existence of irreversible coma. History indicates that the law will follow
medicine and change its present definition of death if the medical profession develops an accepted criteria for determining irreversible coma. Until
the medical profession agrees on a definite set of criteria, however, law will
probably not react. Thus, it is imperative for the medical community to
adopt one set of criteria to determine brain death as soon as possible.
WILLI

F. AmET

THE COMMON LAW RIGHTS TO SUBJACENT SUPPORT
AND SURFACE PRESERVATION
I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most precious property rights of the surface owner is his
right to have his land preserved in its natural state. No one can fully
enjoy his land when the surface is threatened with subsidence or destruction or has subsided or been destroyed. Public policy considerations are
also involved in the right to surface preservation. Land will continue to
increase in value as our population grows, because food, fiber, and recreational areas will be in greater demand. It is in the public interest to
preserve the surface in order to be able to satisfy these future demands.
"[S]trip-mining methods pose a threat to the future utility and beauty
of the land."' The ever-increasing demand for fuel and for consumer goods
has created a strong demand for fossil fuels and minerals, placing a greater
emphasis on mining. With an increase in mining, there may also be an
increase in deeds that sever the minerals from the surface estate. When
a deed severs the mineral rights from the surface estate, the surface owner's
right to the preservation of the surface may conflict with the mineral
owner's right to mine.
This comment deals with two questions that arise from the relation
between the surface owner's common law right to the preservation of the
surface and the mineral owner's right to mine. First, does the surface
owner have a right to support from a mine beneath his land? Second, when
is the surface owner entitled to have his surface preserved in its natural
state, undisturbed by surface mining?
In attempting to answer these questions, one must keep in mind the
various estates affected by a conveyance severing the minerals from the
surface. Before any conveyance severs the mineral rights, the fee owner
owns the surface and the minerals below to the center of the earth.2 The
fee owner may sell the mineral rights while retaining the right to the
surface, or he may sell the surface with a reservation of the mineral rights.
1. P. AvEurr, STRnPPING-COAL RESOURCES OF THE UNIr=D STATES-January

1, 1970, at 25 (U.S. Dep't. Int., Geol. Survey Bull. No. 1822, 1970).
2. See Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 217 Pa. 449, 451, 66 A. 764 (1907);
Continental Coal Co. v. Connellsville By-Prod. Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 44, 138
S.E. 737 (1927).
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Thus, property law recognizes three estates in the land: The surface estate;
the mineral estate; and a "third estate"-the right to support 3
The grant or exception in the deed should limit and define the surface
and mineral estates. 4 When the grant or reservation does not define or
limit those estates, a reasonable approach is to decide each case upon
the language of the grant or reservation, the surrounding circumstances,
and the grantor's intent.5 Usually, the surface estate includes the whole
subsoil that lies above the minerals.6 The mineral estate includes every
stone and rock deposit of metallic or nonmetallic substances. 7 Generally,
sand, gravel, and day are not part of the mineral estate, because they are
a part of the soil.8
I.

TE

RIGHT TO SUBJACENT SUPPORT

A. In General
The right to subjacent support is the right to have the surface remain
supported in its natural state by the underlying strata. 9 Every stratum
owes a duty of support to the overlying strata, and is entitled to support
from the underlying strata.1 0
This right to subjacent support becomes important to the surface
owner when the mineral owner engages in underground mining. The

access to underground mines may be by shaft, slope, or drift openings,

3. 6A A.
IcA LAw OF PROPERTY § 28.36 (A.J. Casner ed. 1954); Montgomery, The Development of the Right of Subjacent Support and the "Third
Estate" in Pennsylvania, 25 TEmP. L.Q. 1 (1951).
4. See Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co., 94 W. Va. 81, 118 S.E. 162 (1928).
The court noted that the term "surface" is ambiguous when used as the subject of a conveyance.
5. Kinder v. La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537
(1923); Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co., 94 W. Va. 81, 118 S.E. 162 (1928).
6. Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist., v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 A.2d
97 (1961); Dolan v. Dolan, 70 W. Va. 76, 73 S.E. 90 (1911).
7. Jeffrey v. Spruce-Boone Land, 112 W. Va. 360, 164 S.E. 292 (1932).
8. Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 (1954) (word minerals
when found in a reservation does not include the ordinary soil); Kinder v.
La Salle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 IM. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923); Holloway
Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 9 So. 2d 228 (1942) (parties' intent was
not to include sand and gravel); Hendler v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 209 Pa. 256,
58 A. 486 (1904); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949); Guinn
v. Acker, 451 S.W.2d 549 ('ex. Civ. App. 1970); Rock House Fork Land Co. v.
Raleigh Brick & Tile Co., 83 W. Va. 20, 97 S.E. 684 (1918) (clay was not within
grant because it could not be secured by ordinary mining processes of tunneling);
see Elkhorn City Land Co. v. Elkhorn City, 459 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1970) (landfill
materials do not constitute minerals, and sandy clay loam and sandy shale were
not considered minerals); Little v. Carter,, 408 S.W.2d 207 (Ky. 1966) (limestone
was considered a part of the soil and was not included in a mineral reservation).
9. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Salardino, 125 Colo. 516, 245 P.2d 461
(1952).
10. Marquette Cement Mining Co. v. Oglesby Coal Co., 253 F. 107, 111
(N.D. Ill. 1918) (right of support is vital to the owner of the overlying surface
and strata); Lenox Coal Co. v. Duncan-Spangler Coal Co., 265 Pa. 572, 109 A.
282 (1920) (mining operations must be so conducted as to leave intact the
superincumbent estate); 6A .Am.cAN LAw oF PROPERTY, § 28.36 (A. J. Casner ed.
1954; Comment, Subsidence Regulation, 6 LAND & WATER L. REv. 543 (1971).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/4
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with some mines employing a combination of these.1 1 There are three
methods of underground mining: Room and pillar mining; long wall
mining; and bord and pillar mining.12 Of these, the room and pillar
method is most frequently used in the United States. Under this method,
coal is mined by driving a series of tunnels through the coal seam in
two directions at right angles, dividing it into blocks. Then, rooms are
worked off of these large tunnels that are driven in solid coal. Intervening
pillars of coal are left to support the overlying rock. After the area has
been mined to its limit, the pillars of coal may be removed. As a result
of removing the pillars, the overlying rock strata may collapse; and the
earth gradually subsides, creating cracks and breaks in the surface land. 18
This will render the land unusable for agricultural purposes; moreover,
it will cause damage to the buildings on the land and destroy sources
of water.
The percentage of coal recovered from a minable seam depends on
several factors. Where coal reserves are large, the percentage of coal to be
extracted is primarily decided by consideration of the number and size
of protective pillars of coal thought necessary to support the roof safely
and the percentage of pillar recovery.14 In such instances, between 30
and 50 percent of the coal may be left behind in the form of pillars.' 5
Thus, a sizable percentage of coal cannot be mined. As an alternative,
artificial supports, such as timber props or rock bolts, may be used to
support the surface. But artificial support is limited, where possible, to
permanent openings.16 Moreover, artificial supports can be expensive, and
timber props may rot out after a period of years.
B. Historical Origins

The right to subjacent support originated in England. In Harris V.
Ryding,' 7 the grantor conveyed the surface, reserving extensive powers to
enter, and to search for and mine minerals. The court said the reservation
entitled the grantor to withdraw minerals only if he left proper support
for the surface.' 8 This was the beginning of the English view that the
owner of the surface estate is entitled to support from the owner of strata
below ex jure naturae.19 In his opinion, Baron Parke recognized that a
reservation should be strictly construed, but he also said that the meaning
and intent of the parties govern.20 He reasoned that because the grantor
intended the surface to be fully held and enjoyed by the grantee, he also
intended to leave reasonable support for the surface. If the grantor removed all the coal, the grantee would not have the proper enjoyment of
11. 5 ENcYCLOPAED A BRITANNICA, Coal & Coal Mining 965 (1973).
12. 7 ENcYCoPmrA AmECANA, Coal 145, 152 (1973).
13. 5 ENCYCLoPAEDIA BRTAN IcA, Coal & Coal Mining 966 (1973).
14. Id.
15. 7 ENCYCLOPEmrA AMmRCANA, Coal 143, 152 (1978).
16. Id. at 158.
17. 151 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. 1889).
18. Id.
19. See Comment, Mine Subsidence Legislation in Pennsylvania and the
Developing Concept of the Police Power, 27 U. Prrr. L. REv. 885 (1966).
20. Harris v. Ryding, 151 Eng. Rep. 27, 31 (Ex. 1839).
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his estate. 21 However, the court decided the case upon a demurrer, so
that it considered a declaration alleging careless, negligent, and improper
workmanship to be admitted. 2 2 Therefore, the court did not consider
whether the right to support was absolute.
In the later case of Humphries v. Brogden,23 no deed or evidence was
available to determine the rights of the surface or mineral owners. The
court held that the mineral owner has the duty to leave sufficient support
for the surface so that it will remain in its natural state.24 The court
used the principle of lateral support as an aid in determining that the right
to subjacent support exists. The principle of lateral support says that an
adjoining landowner may not dig his land so as to cause the land of
another to subside.2 5 Furthermore, the right to lateral support from adjoining land is a right of property passing with the soil and not by grant.2 6
Thus, when the owner of adjoining lots conveys one away, the grantee
is entitled to lateral support from the other lot, although there is no grant
for that purpose.27 The basic reason for lateral support is that it is essential for the protection and enjoyment of property and is in accordance
with the precept that one is not to use his land so as to injure another. 28
The court felt the same reasons were applicable where the conveyance
separated the surface and the minerals. If the surface did not receive
support analogous to lateral support, the surface owner could not securely
enjoy his property. 29 Moreover, the court found a right to support even
in the absence of an allegation of negligence. The court was careful,
however, to distinguish this case from one where the parties' rights had
been varied by deeds.8 0
Later cases accepted the subjacent support doctrine, but stated that
the deed could vary the prima facie rights of the surface owner.8 1 Thus,
the general English rule became that where the surface and mining rights
were severed, the surface owner had a right to the subjacent support of
his land, unless the deed effecting the severance contained an express
32
provision to the contrary.

21. Id. at 31.
22. Id. at 33.
23. 116 Eng. Rep. 1048 (Q.B. 1850).
24. Id. at 1050.
25. Id., quoting 2 Rolle Abr., Trespass (I) pl. 1, 564. Wyatt v. Harrison, 110
Eng. Rep. 320 (K.B. 1832), recognized this principle.
26. Humphries v. Brogden, 116 Eng. Rep. 1048, 1050 (Q.B. 1850).
27. Id. at 1050.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1054.
30. Id.
31. See Dugdale v. Robertson, 69 Eng. Rep. 1289 (Ch. 1857); Smart v.
Morton, 119 Eng. Rep. 393 (Q.B. 1855). Both cases recognized that the surface
owner could waive his right to support by express stipulation. See Proud v.
Bates, 13 L.T.R. (n.s.) 61 (Ch. 1865) (required a plain, dear, and distinct intent
before the right to surface support will be waived in a lease).
32. See Love v. Bell, 9 App. Cas. 286 (H.L.1885); Rowbotham v. Wilson,
11 Eng. Rep. 463 (H.L. 1860) (mine owner had the right to remove the support). Both cases were decided under the Private Inclosure Act of 1770, 9 Geo. 3,
c. 29, § 3.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/4

4

McCutcheon: McCutcheon: Common Law Rights
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[V'ol. 38

C. The Development of the Right to Subjacent Support in the
United States
When the surface has been severed from the mineral estate, the courts
in the United States have followed the English rules on subjacent support.
In Jones v. Wagner,33 one of the earliest cases in the United States to adopt
the doctrine, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court emphasized the ability of
the English courts and their experience in the practical aspects of mining.
The court stated the English rule to be that where there is no contract
to the contrary, the mining property is subservient to the surface to the
extent of sufficient support to sustain the surface.8 4 In Marvin v. Brewster
Iron Mining Co.,35 the New York court recognized, as a right of property,
the surface owner's right to have minerals left in place under the land
in such a way as to support the surface in its natural state. The court
compared the right of subjacent support to that of lateral support, and
found them to be similar.3 6
Thus, the general rule on subjacent support in the United States is
that, when the surface and mineral estates have been severed, the surface
owner has a right of support for his land, unless the conveyance or contract provides otherwise.8 7 Moreover, in the absence of a deed to the
contrary, the right to subjacent support is absolute; 38 it is no defense that
the mineral owner has exercised the highest degree of care in removing the
minerals.

33. 66 Pa. 429 (1870).
34. Id. at 434.
35. 55 N.Y. 538, 556 (1874). The court placed considerable reliance on
English law in its discussion of the rights of the mineral owner to use the surface for mining operations.
36. Id. at 557.
37. Catron v. South Butte Mining Co., 181 F. 941 (9th Cir. 1910); West
Pratt Coal Co. v. Dorman, 161 Ala. 389, 49 So. 849 (1909); Williams v. Gibson,
84 Ala. 228, 4 So. 350 (1888); Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Young, 188 Ark.
191, 65 S.W.2d 1074 (1933); Evans Fuel Co. v. Leyda, 77 Colo. 356, 236 P. 1023
(1925); Jilek v. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co., 382 Ill. 241, 47
N.E.2d 96 (1943); Wilms v. Jess, 94 Ill. 464 (1880); Yandes v. Wright, 66 Ind.
319 (1879); Western Ind. Coal Co. v. Brown, 36 Ind. App. 44, 74 N.E. 1027
(1905); Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Iowa 114, 115 N.W. 497 (1908); Mickle
v. Douglas, 75 Iowa 78, 39 N.W. 198 (1888); Livingston v. Moingona Coal Co.,
49 Iowa 369 (1878); Walsh v. Kansas Fuel Co., 91 Kan. 310, 137 P. 941 (1914);
Piedmont & George's Creek Coal Co. v. Kearney, 114 Md. 496, 79 A. 1013 (Ct.
App. 1911); Ericson v. Michigan Land 9. Iron Co., 50 Mich. 604, 16 N.W. 161
(1883); Burgner v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 340 (1884); Hines v. Union Connells.
ville Coke Co., 271 Pa. 219, 114 A. 521 (1921); Dignan v. Altoona Coal & Coke
Co., 222 Pa. 390, 71 A. 845 (1909); Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485, 14 A. 379
(1888); Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. 81 (1875); Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, 119 Va. 271, 89 S.E. 305 (1916); Winnings v. Wilpen Coal Co., 134 W. Va.
387, 59 S.E.2d 655 (1950); Hall v. Harvey Coal & Coke Co., 89 W. Va. 55, 108
S.E. 491 (1921).
38. Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Barter, 218 Ala. 369, 118 So. 749 (1928);
Corona Coal Co. v. Thomas, 212 Ala. 56, 101 So. 673 (1924); Lloyd v. Catlin Coal
Co., 210 Ill. 460, 71 N.E. 335 (1904); Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Iowa 114,
115 N.W. 497 (1908); Audo v. Western Coal & Mining Co., 99 Kan. 454, 162 P.
344 (1917); Western Ky. Coal Co. v. Dilback, 219 Ky. 783, 294 S.W. 478 (Ct.
App. 1927) (dictum); Southwest Missouri R.R. v. Big Three Mining Co., 138
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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The American cases, as they have developed, have used four theories
to find a right of subjacent support. First, some courts say that the surface
owner is entitled to receive support from the minerals below ex jure
39
naturae.
This right is similar to the landowner's right in a flowing stream,
which entitles him, as against his neighbor, to have the water flow in
its natural condition. 40 Both rights are based on natural justice. 41 Second,
under the maxim of "so use your property as not to injure the rights of
another," 42 some courts hold that the owner of the mineral estate cannot
use his property to interfere with the use of the surface. If removing all the
minerals will injure the surface, then the mine owner must leave sufficient
minerals to support the surface, or erect artificial supports. Third, some
courts imply an easement in favor of subjacent support.4 3 The right to
mine is subservient to the surface owner's right to have the surface perpetually sustained in its natural state. Thus, the right to mine can only
be enjoyed to such an extent as will not cause injury to the dominant
estate, the surface. 44 Fourth, some courts say that the right to surface
support is a part of the freehold and not an easement. 45 The surface
owner is entitled to surface support as a proprietary right. Surface support
is a part of the realty, the same as the surface soil, the subsoil, the water,
46
the rocks, and the minerals.

Usually, it is unimportant which theory a court uses to find the right
Mo. App. 129, 119 S.W. 982 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909); Ohio Collieries Co. v. Cocke,
107 Ohio St. 238, 140 N.E. 356 (1923); Burgner v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 340
(1884); Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, 50 A. 255 (1901); Carlin & Co. v. Chappel,
101 Pa. 348 (1882); Peters v. Bellingham Coal Mines, 178 Wash. 123, 21 P.2d
1024 (1933); Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 134 W. Va. 900, 62 S.E.2d 337
(1950); Cole v. Signal Knob Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 702, 122 S.E. 268 (1924).
39. Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 217 Pa. 449, 66 A. 764 (1907); Jones v.
Wagner, 66 Pa. 429 (1870); see Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480,
53 S.E. 24 (1905) (concurring opinion).
40. Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199, 201 (1877). The case discusses the
right to ex jure naturae support from adjoining land. Such support may also be
due from subjacent land.
41. Foley v. Weyth, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 131, 132 (1861) (discussing lateral
support).
42. Williams v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 4 So. 350 (1888); Burgner v. Humphrey,
41 Ohio St. 340 (1884); Peters v. Bellingham Coal Mines, 173 Wash. 123, 21
P.2d 1024 (1933); Cole v. Signal Knob Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 702, 122 S.E. 268 (1924);
Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S.E. 24 (1905).
43. Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Barter, 218 Ala. 369, 118 So. 749 (1928);
Corona Coal Co. v. Thomas, 212 Ala. 56, 101 So. 673 (1924); West Pratt Coal
Co. v. Dorman, 161 Ala. 389, 49 So. 849 (1909); Empire Star Mines Co. v. Butler,
62 Cal. App. 2d 466, 145 P.2d 49 (1944) (dictum); Mickle v. Douglas, 75 Iowa
78, 39 N.W. 198 (1888); West Ky. Coal Co. v. Dilbank, 219 Ky. 783, 294 S.W.
478 (1927) (dictum); Chicago & A. R.R. v. Brandau, 81 Mo. App. 1 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1899); Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S.E. 24 (1905).
44. Mickle v. Douglas, 75 Iowa 78, 39 N.W. 198 (1888).
45. Colorado Fuel c Iron Corp. v. Salardino, 125 Colo. 516, 245 P.2d 461
(1952); Southwest Mo. R.R. v. Big Three Mining Co., 138 Mo. App. 129, 119
S.W. 982 (K.C. Ct. App. 1909); Berkey v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 229
Pa. 417, 78 A. 1004 (1911); Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S.E.
24 (1905) (concurring opinion); Humphries v. Brogden, 116 Eng. Rep. 1048
(Q.B. 1850).
46. Audo v. Western Coal 8: Mining Co., 99 Kan. 454, 162 P. 344 (1917).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol38/iss2/4
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of subjacent support. Rarely does the court rely exclusively on any one
theory; most courts prefer to enumerate several of the theories as reasons
for adopting the general rule on subjacent support. 47 The theory the
court adopts could make a difference, however, in determining whether
the surface owner has parted with his right to subjacent support.48 For
instance, the maxim of "so use your property as not to injure others"
relates to the enjoyment of property, rather than absolute ownership.
A court may require less evidence to find a waiver of support when a
rule governing the enjoyment of property is involved than when a prop49
erty right is involved.
Although the general subjacent support rule appears to protect the
surface estate, it should be noted that this protection may be illusory in
a state that follows the minority rule in determining when the surface
owner's cause of action accrues and when the statute of limitations begins
to run. The minority rule developed in Pennsylvania, where the courts
hold that the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins
to run when the underlying support is removed. 50 The practical effect of
this holding may be to render the subjacent support rule ineffective. In
Pennsylvania, for instance, if insufficient support causes the surface to
subside six years after the mining occurred, the six-year statute of limitations will bar the surface owner from suing. This places an almost impossible burden on the surface owner, who has the burden of proving
that the unmined portion of the mineral is insufficient to support his
land.51 Under this rule, the court must decide whether or not the mineral
owner has violated his duty of support before subsidence occursS 2 It
is no defense that the surface owner was ignorant of the condition of
insufficient support. 53 This rule may not produce as much hardship as
expected, however, because apparently most of the subsidence will occur
54
within two or three years after removal of the minerals.
The majority rule is that a cause of action does not accrue and the

statute of limitations does not begin to run until the surface has actually
been damaged. 5 5 Thus, the surface owner's cause of action arises when

47. See Burgner v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 840, 858 (1884).
48. Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S.E. 24 (1905) (concurring opinion).
49. Id. This maxim applies equally to owners of all types of estates in land
and has no special force when applied to surface and subjacent estates in land.
50. Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, 50 A. 255 (1901); see Woods v. Pittsburg Coal Co., 230 Pa. 197, 79 A. 499 (1911); Tischler v. Pennsylvania Coal Co,.
218 Pa. 82, 66 A. 988 (1907); City of Carbondale v. Hudson Coal Co., 58 Lack.
Jur. 233 (C.P. 1957).
51. Comment, Limitation of Actions for Failure of Subiacent Support, 20
WASH. & LE L. RPv. 117, 120 (1965).
52. Id. at 122-23.
53. Comment, supra note 19, at 836.
54. Id.
55. West Pratt Coal Co. v. Dorman, 161 Ala. 389, 49 So. 849 (1909); Western
Coal S&Mining Co. v. Randolph, 191 Ark. 1115, 89 S.W.2d 741 (1936); Empire
Star Mines Co. v. Butler, 62 Cal. App. 2d 466, 145 P.2d 49 (1944); Wanless v.
Peabody Coal Co., 294 Ill. App. 401, 13 N.E.2d 996 (1938); Treece v. Southern
Gem Coal Corp., 245 II. App. 113 (1923); Walsh v. Kansas Fuel Co., 102 Kan.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1973
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the surface subsides, because that is when his enjoyment of the surface
has been disturbed. 1 6 The majority rule is consistent with general subjacent support rules and is the more equitable rule.
C. Waiver or Release of Subjacent Support
As with any other right, the owner of the surface may waive or release
his right to subjacent support.5 7 Express waiver may occur in three manners. The simplest way is for the fee owner to convey his mineral rights
to the grantee and expressly waive his right of support.55 Secondly, the

fee owner may convey the surface, reserving the minerals and stipulating

for a release of subjacent support in the conveyance. 59 Finally, the surface
owner may release or waive his right to support in an appropriate writing
after the severance of the mineral estate. 60 An express waiver of subjacent
support will be enforced according to its terms, unless it is contrary to
some law or public policy.61
The surface owner may also waive his right to subjacent support by
implication. The courts, however, are protective of the right to subjacent
support, and carefully construe deeds to prevent the destruction of surface
rights. 62 For example, some courts have implied a covenant to protect
the surface solely from the nature of the transaction, even though the

29, 169 P. 219 (1917); Audo v. Western Coal & Mining Co., 99 Kan. 454, 162 P.
844 (1917); Comment, supra note 51, at 118. The majority rule follows the
English rule of Backhouse v. Bonomi, 11 Eng. Rep. 825 (H.L. 1861).
56. Comment, supra note 51, at 118.
57. Mason v. Peabody Coal Co., 820 Ill. App. 850, 51 N.E.2d 285 (1948);
Cope v. United States Fuel Co., 229 Ill. App. 248 (1928); Wesley v. Chicago,
Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co., 221 Ill. App. 427 (1920); Paull v. Island Coal
Co., 44 Ind. App. 218, 88 N.E. 959 (1909); Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Johnson, 249
S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1952); Rush v. Sines Bros. & Co., 84 Ohio App. 88, 170 N.E.
879 (1929); Graff Furnace Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 244 Pa. 592, 91 A. 508 (1914);
Madden v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 212 Pa. 68, 61 A. 559 (1905); Williams v.
Hay, 120 Pa. 485 (1888); Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 14 (1880); Coleman v.
Chadwick, 80 Pa. 81 (1875); Simmers v. Star Coal & Coke Co., 118 W. Va. 809, 167
S.E. 787 (1988); Continental Coal Co. v. Connellsville By-Prod. Coal Co., 104
W. Va. 44, 188 S.E. 787 (1927); Godfrey v. Weyanoke Coal & Coke Co., 82 W.
Va. 665, 97 S.E. 186 (1918); Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 58
S.E. 24 (1905).
58. Paull v. Island Coal Co., 44 Ind. App. 218, 88 N.E. 959 (1909); Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Johnson, 249 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1952); Miles v. Pennsylvania
Coal Co., 214 Pa. 544, 68 A. 1082 (1906); Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. 15 (1880);
Continental Coal Co. v. Connellsville By-Prod. Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 44, 188
S.E. 787 (1927); Comment, supra note 19, at 887.
59. Madden v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 212 Pa. 68, 61 A. 559 (1905); Comment, supra note 19, at 887.
60. Comment, supra note 19, at 887.
61. Continental Coal Co. v. Connellsville By-Prod. Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 44,
188 S.E. 787 (1927). An express waiver was found in the following cases: Cope
v. United States Fuel Co., 229 Ill. App. 248 (1928); Paull v. Island Coal Co.,
44 Ind. App. 218, 88 N.E. 959 (1909); Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Johnson, 249 S.W.2d
745, (Ky. 1952); Issacs v. Inland Steel Co., 805 Ky. 777, 205 S.W.2d 681 (1947);
Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 214 Pa. 544, 68 A. 1082 (1906); Madden v.
Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 212 Pa. 68, 61 A. 559 (1905).
62. Mason v. Peabody Coal Co., 820 Ill. App. 850, 51 N.E.2d 285 (1948).
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deed contained no words to that effect. 63 Generally, the courts require that
the language of the deed or conveyance be dear and distinct before they
64
will find a waiver of the right to subjacent support.
In some cases, it may make a difference with respect to finding an
implied waiver of subjacent support whether the grantor conveys the
surface estate reserving the mineral estate, or whether he grants the
minerals with a reservation of the surface. When the deed is ambiguous
or the parties' intent unascertainable, a useful rule of construction is
that the deed is to be construed more strongly against the grantor or the
party drafting it.65 Where the grantor has drafted the deed and sold the
surface without expressing a waiver of subjacent support, construing the
deed most strongly against him would tend toward a finding of no waiver
of subjacent support. Generally, the grantor may do nothing to injure
the estate he conveys. 66 To allow him to remove the subjacent support
would be in derogation of his grant. So, when the grantor sells the surface

and reserves the minerals in general terms, there may be an implied
convenant to mine so as to avoid materially damaging the surface. 07 On
the other hand, when the grantor grants the minerals and reserves the
surface in a deed that he drafted, there is a possible argument that he
thereby waives subjacent support. Because the surface owner failed to
reserve the right to subjacent support, the grant may be strictly construed
against him to allow the owner of the mineral estate to remove all the
minerals without leaving subjacent support. Some courts have refused to
make this distinction, and hold it is immaterial whether the two interests
have been created by a conveyance of the surface with a mineral reservation,
63. Catron v. South Butte Mining Co., 181 F. 941 (9th Cir. 1910); see
Evans Fuel Co. v. Leyda, 77 Colo. 356, 236 P. 1023 (1925); Campbell v. Louisville Coal Mining Co., 39 Colo. 379, 89 P. 767 (1907); Mickle v. Douglas, 75 Iowa
78, 39 N.W. 198 (1888); Dignan v. Altoona Coal & Coke Co., 222 Pa. 390, 71 A.
845 (1909) (the court found a reservation of the right of subjacent support.
64. Catron v. South Butte Mining Co., 181 F. 941 (9th Cir. 1910); Evans
Fuel Co. v. Leyda, 77 Colo. 356, 236 P. 1023 (1925); Wilms v. Jess, 94 Ill. 464
(1880); Seitz v. Coal Valley Mining Co., 149 Ill. App. 85 (1909); Yandes v.
Wright, 66 Ind. 319 (1879); Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Iowa 114, 115
N.W. 497 (1908); Audo v. Western Coal & Mining Co., 99 Kan. 454, 162 P. 344
(1917); Walsh v. Kansas Fuel Co., 91 Kan. 310, 137 P. 941 (1914); Piedmont &
George's Creek Coal Co. v. Kearney, 114 Md. 496, 79 A. 1013 (Ct. App. 1911);
Ohio Collieries Co. v. Cocke, 107 Ohio St. 238, 140 N.E. 356 (1923); Burgher v.
Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 340 (1884); Hines v. Union Connellsville Coke Co., 271
Pa. 219, 114 A. 521 (1921); Lenox Coal Co. v. Duncan-Spangler Coal Co., 265
Pa. 572, 109 A. 282 (1920); Dignan v. Altoona Coal & Coke Co., 222 Pa. 390, 71
A. 845 (1909); Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485, 14 A. 379 (1888); Stonegap Colliery
Co. v. Hamilton, 119 Va. 271, 89 S.E. 305 (1916); Peters v. Bellingham Coal Mines,
173 Wash. 123, 21 P.2d 1024 (1933); Winnings v. Wilpen Coal Co., 134 W. Va.
387, 59 S.E.2d 655 (1950); Cole v. Signal Knob Coal Co., 95 W. Va. 702, 122
S.E. 268 (1924); Goodykoontz v. White Star Mining Co., 94 W. Va. 654, 119
S.E. 862 (1923); Hall v. Harvey Coal & Coke Co., 89 W. Va. 55, 108 S.E. 491
(1921).
65. McIntire v. Marian Coal Co., 190 Ky. 342, 227 S.W. 298 (1921); WilkesBarre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 A.2d 97 (1961); see
New Charter Coal Co. v. McKee, 411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830 (1963).
66. Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Iowa 114, 115 N.W. 497 (1908).
67. Id.
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or by a grant of the minerals with a reservation of the surface.6 8 In either
case, the presumption arises that the owner of the minerals is not to

injure the owner of the soil above. 69 The ordinary rule that the grant is
to be more strongly construed against the grantor is reversed by the rigid
requirement that a waiver be clearly expressed or necessarily implied.7o

In determining whether there has been an implied waiver of the
right to subjacent support, the normal approach is that the parties' intention must govern.7 1 If the court finds the parties intended to waive subjacent support, it will effectuate that intent. The court will not, however,

infer an intent to waive the right to surface support unless the language
necessarily imports such a result. 72
An express reservation or grant of the usual mining rights and privileges will not support an inference of waiver of surface support7 3 Usual
mining rights include the following rights: To explore for minerals; to
mine and remove the minerals; to enter and exit in order to get at the
minerals; to construct a shaft; to erect roads; and to use a reasonable
portion of the surface for mining facilities. These rights refer only to
the right to get at the minerals and remove them; they have nothing to
do with the right to subjacent support. Moreover, even if the parties fail
to provide for these rights in the deed, a court will infer them on the
principle that when a thing is granted, all the means to obtain it are
also granted.7 4 Thus, the expression of mining rights, which would otherwise be implied, should not imply any intent to waive subjacent support.
Similarly, a grant or reservation to the mineral owner of the right
to use the surface is insufficient to indicate an intent to waive subjacent
support. 75 The use of the surface gives certain rights that are indispensable
to carrying on mining operations, such as the rights to explore the surface,
sink shafts, and erect structures.7 6 Again, this may only show a right to
get at the minerals, and not a waiver of subjacent support. Also, a compensation clause for damage to the surface is insufficient indicia of an intention
to waive subjacent support. In England, a compensation clause for damages
to the surface applies only to acts done on the surface and to damages
done by underground workings. 77 Further, a covenant that releases the
68. Catron v. South Butte Mining Co., 181 F. 941 (9th Cir. 1910); Burgner

v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 340 (1884).
69. Burgner v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 340 (1884).

70. English v. Harris Clay Co., 225 N.C. 770, 35 S.E.2d 329 (1945).
71. Stilley v. Pittsburgh-Buffalo Co., 234 Pa. 492, 83 A. 478 (1912).
72. Dignan v. Altoona Coal & Coke Co., 222 Pa. 390, 71 A. 845 (1909).
73. Hines v. Union Connellsville Coke Co., 271 Pa. 122, 114 A. 521 (1921)

(per curiam); see Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 140 Iowa 114, 115 N.W. 497
(1908); Ericson v. Michigan Land 9: Iron Co., 50 Mich. 604, 16 N.W. 161 (1883).

74. Porter v. Mack Mfg. Co., 65 W. Va. 636, 64 S.E. 853 (1909); see Williams

v. Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 4 So. 350 (1888); Marvin v. Brewster Iron Mining Co.,
55 N.Y. 538 (1874); Squires v. Lafferty, 95 W. Va. 307, 121 S.E. 90 (1924). When

a court infers mining rights, it will still require subjacent support. Williams v.
Gibson, 84 Ala. 228, 4 So. 350 (1888).
75. Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485, 14 A. 379 (1888).
76. Id.

77. Davis v. Trehane, 6 App. Cas. 460 (H.L. 1881); Richards v. Jenkins, 18
L.T.R. (n.s.) 437 (Ex. 1868).
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right to damages resulting from the exercise of mining rights and privileges
does not indicate a waiver of subjacent support.7 8 Such a covenant refers
to the proper exercise of mining rights and privileges in the development
and operation of mines, and thus has no relation to subjacent support.7 0
A sale or grant of all the coal with the right to mine and remove
does not show a clear intention to waive subjacent support.8 0 A sale of
all the coal is ambiguous. It may mean the sale of so much of the coal
as can be mined subject to a condition of leaving sufficient artificial or
natural support, or it may allow removal of literally all the coal. At any
rate, such a sale fails to meet the requirement of a clear waiver of subjacent
support. Thus, the sale will convey the entire body of coal subject to
absolute support of the surface.
Likewise, a sale of the surface that reserves the coal with a right to
mine and remove is insufficient to find an intent to imply a waiver."1
For, when the surface is sold, the grantor knows that the grantee may
use the surface for farming or other purposes. By making such a grant,
the grantor consents to these uses.8 2 The grantor also knows that with all
the coal removed the surface will subside. To reserve rights inconsistent
with the grantee's full enjoyment of the surface, the grantor must use
unequivocal language. 88 Because there is no such unequivocal language
in a mere conveyance of the surface with reservation of mining and
removal rights, there is no waiver of subjacent support. Furthermore, it
is difficult to suppose that the parties contemplated a reservation of a

right that would enable the grantor to render the subject matter of the
conveyance useless.8 4 It takes more to find an implied waiver of subjacent

support than a mere finding that it is otherwise impossible to mine all
the coal. 8 5

In West Virginia, however, the courts have held that a deed conveying
"all" the coal with the right to mine and remove "all" the coal implies

the surface owner's clear intent to waive the right to subjacent support.8 6
The rationale is that it is inconceivable that one who purchases or reserves

the surface would deliberately covenant for the removal of all the coal,

87
if he were expecting the surface to be undisturbed.

Although the doctrine of waiver of subjacent support by use of the
78. Dignan v. Altoona Coal & Coke Co., 222 Pa. 390, 71 A. 845 (1909).
79. Id.
80. Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, 119 Va. 271, 89 S.E. 805 (1916); see
Dignan v. Altoona Coal &cCoke Co., 222 Pa. 390, 71 A. 845 (1909).
81. Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Hamilton, 119 Va. 271, 89 S.E. 305 (1916).
82. Id.
88. Id.
84. Hall v. Harvey Coal ge Coke Co., 89 W. Va. 55, 108 S.E. 491 (1921).
85. Evans Fuel Co. v. Leyda, 77 Colo. 856, 236 P. 1028 (1925); Noonan v.
Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, 50 A. 255 (1901).
86. Stamp v. Windsor Power House Coal Co.,
- W. Va. , 177
S.E.2d 146 (1970); Simmers v. Star Coal &cCoke Co., 118 W. Va. 809, 167 S.E.
787 (193); Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480, 58 S.E. 24 (1905); Note,
The Law of Subjacent Support and the West Virginia Rule, 28 W. VA. L.Q. 149
(1922).
87. See, e.g., Simmers v. Star Coal & Coke Co., 118 W. Va. 809, 167 S.E. 737
(1938).
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magic word "all" has become firmly established in West Virginia,88 those
courts hold that a clause granting all the coal with the right to mine
and remove the "said coal" implies no intent to waive subjacent support. 89
The words "said coal" in the mining clause may mean only so much of
the coal as can be removed without injury to the surface, rather than
all the coal. 90 Thus, because the meaning of the words is subject to doubt
and uncertainty, there is no dear and distinct intent to waive subjacent
support.Ol
A grant of all the coal with the right to mine and remove it without
liability for damage to the surface may waive subjacent support in Pennsylvania.9 2 The words "waiving all damages" show a manifest intent to waive
damages resulting from mining and removing all the coal.9 3 Such damages
include those arising from a removal of subjacent support. The object
of such language is to secure the right to mine all the coal without liability
for damages. 94 Likewise, a deed containing an exception of all the coal
and minerals with a right to mine, a release of damages to the surface,
and a release and discharge from any damages to the premises expresses
a clear intent to waive subjacent support.9 5 However, a covenant that gives
the lessee the right to mine in the most economical method and in accordance with state law will not enlarge rights to include a waiver of subjacent
support.9 6
From this discussion, it is apparent that the cases involving implied
waiver of subjacent support fall into three categories. First, there is a
grant or reservation of the minerals without mentioning surface support
or damages to the surface resulting from mining and removal of the
minerals.97 No waiver of surface support occurs in this situation, as it
falls under the general rule that subjacent support is waived only expressly
or by necessary implication. 98 Second, the deed may contain a grant or
reservation of coal coupled with mining rights and a waiver of damages
resulting from proper exercise of mining privileges. 99 Most courts hold
this waiver has no reference to the right of subjacent support1 00 If one
88. Stamp v. Windsor Power House Coal Co.,

-

W. Va.

-,

177

S.E.2d 146 (1970).
89. Erwin v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 184 W. Va. 900, 62 S.E.2d 837 (1950);
Winnings v. Wilpen Coal Co., 134 W. Va. 387, 59 S.E.2d 655 (1950).
90. Winnings v. Wilpen Coal Co., 134 W. Va. 887, 59 S.E.2d 655 (1950).
91. Id.
92. Stilley v. Pittsburgh-Buffalo Co., 234 Pa. 492, 83 A. 478 (1912); Kellert
v. Rochester & Pitt. Coal & Iron Co., 226 Pa. 27, 74 A. 789 (1909) (per curiam).
See Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 217 Pa. 449, 66 A. 764 (1907); Madden v.
Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 212 Pa. 63, 61 A. 559 (1905) (per curiam); Note, When
is the Right to Surface Support Waived?, 54 DicK. L. REv. 92 (1949).

93. Stilley v. Pittsburgh-Buffalo Co., 284 Pa. 492, 83 A. 478 (1912).
94. Kellert v. Rochester & Pitt. Coal 8-Iron Co., 226 Pa. 27, 74 A. 789
(1909) (per curiam).
95. Graff Furnace Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 244 Pa. 592, 91 A. 508 (1914).
96. Lenox Coal Co. v. Duncan-Spangler Coal Co., 265 Pa. 572, 109 A.
282 (1919).
97. Stilley v. Pittsburgh-Buffalo Co., 234 Pa. 492, 83 A. 478 (1912).
98. Id.
99. Id.

100. Id.
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can show, however, that the parties intended that the waiver of damages
clause include damages from subsidence, a court may find a waiver of
subjacent support. Third, a deed containing a grant or reservation of
minerals with mining rights followed by a waiver of damages to the surface
resulting from the removal of minerals waives subjacent support by implication.1o'

III. Tbn

RIGHT TO HAVE THE SURFACE UNDISTURBED BY SURFACE MINING

A. Introduction to Surface Mining
A brief description of surface mining is necessary to an understanding
of the importance of the right to have the surface preserved. Simply stated,
surface mining consists of removing the topsoil, rock, and other strata
that lie above the minerals in order to get at the minerals and remove

them.102 Surface mining includes five types of mining: Open pit mining;

strip mining; auger mining; dredging; and hydraulic mining.103 Of these,
this comment is primarily concerned with the most common-open pit,
strip, and auger mining. The end result of surface mining is a drastic
reshaping of the surface, as the protective, vegetative covering is destroyed
and the soil and rock overlying the mineral deposit are frequently left
in giant piles cast onto adjoining land. 0 4 A real eyesore remains unless
some type of reclamation program is undertaken. In the past, the strip
mining of 4.4 billion tons of coal has distributed 2,450 square miles of
land.105106
An estimated 128 billion tons of coal remain available for strip
mining.
Such mining could result in disturbing 71,000 square miles of
107
larger than Pennsylvania and West Virginia combined.
area
land-an
Thus, surface mining will continue to be a controversial subject.
When the grantor expressly reserves or grants the right to surface
mine, the court will enforce the instrument according to its terms in the
absence of statutory inhibition, fraud, or other vitiating circumstances. 108
On the other hand, the court will not allow surface mining when the
instrument prohibits it. The problem arises when the deed gives broad
mining rights, but says nothing expressly about the right to surface
mine.
In this situation, the court must infer the intent of the parties. The questions then become: (1) What factors will the courts consider in determining whether surface mining is permissible; and (2) will the courts favor
the surface owner against the destruction of his estate?
B. Applicability of Subjacent Support Rules to Surface Mining
The rules on subjacent support may be useful in determining whether
the deed grants the right to surface mine. While both surface and deep
101. Id.
102. U.S. DEP'T OF INTEruOR, SURFACE MINING AND OUR ENVIRONMENT 33
(1967).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 51.
105. P. Avmr=, STRIPPING-CoAL RESOURCES OF TiE UNITED STATS-January
1, 1970, at 28 (U.S. Dep't. Int., Geol. Survey Bull. No. 1322, 1970).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Tokas v. JJ. Arnold Co., 122 W. Va. 613, 11 S.E.2d 759 (1940).
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or shaft mining impair the surface estate, surface mining does so much
more severely: it virtually destroys the surface, whereas deep mining only
damages the surface. 109 If the surface owner has a proprietary right to
subjacent support, he should have at least an equal right to the preservation of the surface.1 1 0 Furthermore, the retention of the right to subjacent
support conflicts with the right to strip mine.11 1 The policy reasons that
favor subjacent support apply equally to the right of surface preservation
and form an integral part of that right. No person can properly enjoy his
property if the surface has been destroyed. Thus, some courts in cases
involving surface mining apply a rule similar to the subjacent support
rule; namely, the surface owner has a right to have his surface undisturbed
unless the deed provides to the contrary. 112 Waiver of the right to surface
preservation generally requires dear expression or necessary implication.1 13
C. Interpretationof the Deed to Determine Whether the Right to Surface
Is Implicit
1. Aids in Interpretation and Construction
The determination of whether the right to surface mine is implicit
will usually involve the proper interpretation or construction of the terms
of the deed.1 1 4 The parties' intent governs in determining whether surface mining is permissible. 115 Several principles aid in ascertaining the
parties' intent. The intention of the parties at the time the contract is
executed governs." 6 Moreover, the entire deed or contract must be read

109. Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970).
110. West Virginia-Pitt. Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46
(1947).
111. Note, Construction of Deeds Cranting the Right to Strip Mine, 40 U.
CIN. L. Rv. 304, 312 (1971).
112. Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440, 474 P.2d 794 (1970) (owner of the mineral estate may remove the underlying minerals but must support the surface
and cannot destroy the surface by strip mining); Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262,
215 P. 534 (1923); Franklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Op. 240, 119 N.E.2d 688 (C.P.
1954); East Ohio Gas Co. v. James Bros. Coal Co., 53 Ohio L. Abs. 438, 85
N.E.2d 816 (C.P. 1948); Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 390, 102 A.2d
893 (1954) (strip mining allowed because surface support was waived); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568 (1950) (strip mining allowed
because surface support was waived); West Virginia-Pitt. Coal Co. v. Strong, 129
W. Va. 832, 42 S.E. 2d 46 (1947).
113. Smith v. Moore, 172 Colo. 440, 474 P.2d 794 (1970); Barker v. Mintz,
73 Colo. 262, 215 P. 534 (1923); Franklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Op. 240, 119
N.E.2d 688 (C.P. 1954); East Ohio Gas Co. v. James Bros. Coal Co., 53 Ohio L.
Abs. 438, 85 N.E.2d 816 (C.P. 1948); West Virginia-Pitt. Coal Co. v. Strong, 129
W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947).
114. Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 A.2d
97 (1961).
115. See Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970); Merrill v.
Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., 409 Pa. 68, 185 A.2d 573 (1962); Wilkes-Barre
Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 A.2d 97 (1961); West
Virginia-Pitt. Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1947).
116. Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970); Wilkes-Barre
Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 A.2d 97 (1961); see Oresta v.
Romano Bros., 137 W. Va. 633, 73 S.E.2d 622 (1952).
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One standard of interpretation is

to interpret the provisions of the deed as would a reasonably intelligent
person, acquainted with all operative usages and knowing all the circumstances prior to and contemporaneous with the making of the con11 8
tract.
When the written instrument is ambiguous, the courts frequently
construe it more strongly against the grantor 1 9 or the party drafting
it.120 When the deed uses the grantor's words, he should be responsible
for the language.1 2 ' Because the grantor usually has control over the
drafting of the instrument, a doubtful reservation or exception in a
deed will be construed most strongly against him and in favor of the
grantee.' 22 On the other hand, if the grantee of the mineral estate (usually
a mining company) prepares the deed, it should be most strongly construed against the grantee for the same reason.
The courts sometimes refuse to construe an instrument more strongly
against the drafting party where a policy reason appears for not doing
so. Thus, one court refused to use the rule to enlarge the rights of the
grantee when it would have meant resolving ambiguities in favor of
permitting strip mining. 2 3 This court recognized that rules of construc-

tion are valuable aids of interpretation, but refused to make a contract

that the parties did not intend.' 24 Finally, of course, this rule of construction does not apply when the deed contains no ambiguity. 12 5
2. Circumstances Surrounding the Execution of the Deed
One important factor in finding the parties' intent is the set of
circumstances existing at the time the deed was executed.126 If the deed
is ambiguous, all the circumstances existing at the time of execution
should aid in determining the intent of the parties.' 27 For example, a
court may refuse to imply the right to strip mine if strip mining was an
unknown method of mining when the contract was made. 2 8 On the other
117. Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 A.2d 97
(1961); see Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970); New Charter
Coal Co. v. McKee, 411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830 (1963).
118. Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 A.2d
97 (1961).
119. Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956); McIntire v. Marian
Coal Co., 190 Ky. 342, 227 S.W. 298 (1921); Comment, Broad Form DeedObstacle to Peaceful Co-existence Between Mineral and Surface Owners, 60
Ky. L.J. 742, 747 (1972).
120. Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 A.2d
97 (1961); see New Charter Coal Co. v. McKee, 411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830 (1963).
121. Kentucky Diamond Mining & Development Co. v. Kentucky Transvaal
Diamond Co., 141 Ky. 97, 132 S.W. 397 (1910); Comment, supra note 119, at 747.
122. Kentucky Diamond Mining & Developing Co. v. Kentucky Transvaal
Diamond Co., 141 Ky. 97, 132 S.W. 397 (1910); Comment, supra note 119, at 747.
123. Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970).
124. Id.
125. Comment, supra note 119, at 748.
126. Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970).
127. Id.; New Charter Coal Co. v. McKee, 411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830 (1963).
128. See United States v. Polino, 131 F. Supp. 772 (N.D.W. Va. 1955); Carson
v. Missouri Pac. R.1, 212 Ark 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948); Smith v. Moore, 172
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hand, one court allowed open pit mining because the surface owner
knew the character of the minerals recovered, manner of occurrence, and
mode of mining in the locality.' 2 9 Other courts have implied the right
to mine by the open pit method where surface mining was a known method
of mining when the contract was made. 13 0 The argument in favor of this
result is that the broad mining clause gave the mineral owner the right to
remove the minerals by any method of mining, and the parties' failure
to exclude surface mining, a known method, indicates their intent to
permit surface mining. A countervailing argument is that if surface
mining was known in the locality and the parties intended it, they could
easily have provided for this method of mining in the deed.' 3 '
If both parties know that one is acquiring or reserving the surface
for forestry or agricultural purposes, the circumstances show no intent to
allow surface or strip mining.132 When both parties know the land has a
high value for agricultural or recreational purposes, and they fail to make

express provision for strip mining in the deed, strip mining should not
be implied. It is unreasonable to infer that the surface owner would
consent to the destruction of his valuable land. On the other hand, if
the land has a low value or utility, the court may be more willing to
infer that the parties intended the right to strip mine since the value
of the minerals probably greatly outweighs the value of the land. Although the utility or quality of the land is a relevant factor, it will not
by itself determine whether a court will infer the right to strip mine. 3 3
3. Effect of Waiver of Subjacent Support

Language that waives subjacent support shows no intent to permit

strip mining.134 There is a substantial difference between damage resulting
from the subsidence of the surface and the total destruction that strip
mining inflicts. Furthermore, language allowing removal of subjacent
support refers to tunnel or shaft mining and, without words of qualification, cannot be distorted into referring to strip mining. 3 5 In Pennsylvania,

Colo. 440, 474 P.2d 794 (1970); Franklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Op. 240, 119 N.E.2d
688 (C.P. 1954); Stewart v. Chernicky, 489 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970); New
Charter Coal Co. v. McKee, 411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830 (1963); Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, 170 A.2d 97 (1961).
129. English v. Harris Clay Co., 255 N.C. 467, 35 S.E.2d 329 (1945).
130. Benton v. United States Manganese Corp., 229 Ark. 181, 313 S.W.2d 839
(1958); English v. Harris Clay Co., 225 N.C. 467, 35 S.E.2d 329 (1945); Banks
v. Tennessee Mineral Prod. Corp., 202 N.C. 408, 163 S.E. 108 (1932).
131. Comment, supra note 119, at 749.
132. Franklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Op. 240, 119 N.E.2d 688 (C.P. 1954);
Merrill v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., 409 Pa. 68, 185 A.2d 573 (1962);
Rochez Bros. Inc. v. Duricka, 374 Pa. 262, 97 A.2d 825 (1953) (dictum).
133. New Charter Coal Co. v. McKee, 411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830 (1963).
134. Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970); Merrill v. Manufacturers Light &Heat Co., 409 Pa. 68, 185 A.2d 573 (1962); Rochez Bros. Inc. v.
Duricka, 374 Pa. 262, 97 A.2d 825 (1953).
135. Merrill v. Manufacturers Light and Heat Co., 409 Pa. 68, 185 A.2d 573
(1962) (release of the surface support was insufficient to imply an intent to
strip mine).
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however, a general waiver of surface support has been found to imply
the right to strip mine. 18 6
4. Effect of Grant of Mining Rights
Language that conveys the right to mine and remove minerals by
8 7
Moreunderground mining does not allow removal by strip mining.
over, language to the effect that mining rights are not to interfere with
18
agricultural purposes may indicate an intent to deny strip mining.
When the deed only gives the right to shaft or deep mine, the release
of liability for injury to the surface refers only to deep mining and is
inapplicable to damage caused by strip mining. 8 9 Mining rights that, at
the time of their creation, limit, regulate, and govern operations and
methods that are engaged in chiefly beneath the surface do not allow
the removal of the overlying surface. 140 Again, there is a distinction between an imposition of a necessary burden on the surface of the land
containing minerals and the destruction of that surface. Finally, it is
insufficient that only the wording of the grant of mining rights supports
a construction that strip mining is permissible; rather, the entire in141
strument must support that construction.
Frequently, the mineral owner argues that the right to strip mine
is implicit where the deed gives comprehensive rights and privileges with
the right to use the surface. Most deeds that sever the surface and mineral
estates contain a "use" clause specifying what the mineral owner may do
upon the land. Further, even if the deed lacks such a clause, courts will
imply one.' 42 The miner will contend that the right to use the surface
includes the right to scrape it off and get the minerals out.148 To strengthen
his contention, the mineral owner will point out that the minerals can
only be removed by strip mining. Without more, however, courts are
reluctant to accept this argument. One court said that the "use" of the
surface cannot mean destruction of the surface and, therefore, refused to
imply strip mining. 44 Moreover, "use" and comprehensive mining rights
clauses usually contain technical verbiage that applies only to a particular
type of mining. There is also a distinction between the ownership of
minerals and the ownership of mining rights. 145 The mineral owner may
136. See Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 390, 102 A.2d 893 (1954);
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568 (1950).
137. Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970); Rochez v. Duricka,
374 Pa. 262, 268, 97 A.2d 825, 827 (1953) ("if they intended to speak about
strip mining they would not use the language which applies peculiarly to underground mining").
138. See Franklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Op. 240, 119 N.E.2d 688 (C.P. 1954);
Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Duricka, 374 Pa. 262, 97 A.2d 825 (1953) (dictum).
139. Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970) (concluding that
a clause providing for ventilation in the mine referred to shaft or deep mining).
140. Oresta v. Romano Bros. Inc., 137 W. Va. 633, 73 S.E.2d 622 (1952).
141. New Charter Coal Co. v. McKee, 411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830 (1963).
142. Cole v. Ross Coal Co., 150 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.W. Va.), affd, 249 F.2d
600 (4th Cir. 1957).
143. Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, 215 P. 534 (1923).
144. Id.
145. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568 (1950) (dissenting

opinion).
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own all the minerals and still be unable to remove them because of a
limitation on the mining rights.148 Thus, the parties' intent in inserting
a comprehensive mining rights clause in the deed may be to rule out such
a limitation, rather than to permit strip mining. For these reasons, the right
to use the surface does not display a dear and distinct intent to imply
surface or strip mining.
But, absent limiting words or circumstances of the types just discussed, the right "to mine, excavate, and remove" may be broad enough
to include any method of recovering the coal. 147 Further, if the parties
fail to mention deep mining and auger mining in the deed, the court
may feel that their failure to mention strip mining is insignificant.1 48
Since the parties neither expressed nor excluded any method of mining,
any method may be employed. In addition, circumstances at the time of
execution of the deed may show that the parties had no intention of
excluding strip mining as a method of mining. 14 9
Similarly, a conveyance or reservation of the full enjoyment of mineral rights with no restrictions as to the method of severing the coal may
imply that the mineral owner has acquired the right to remove the minerals by any method. 15 0 When the cumulative effect of the provisions of
a deed is to give the mineral owner the right to excavate and remove all
the coal anywhere on the surface by any method, old or new, the' result
is an implied release of the right to the preservation of the surface.' 51
Moreover, one court has inferred the reservation of the right to strip
mine from a provision reserving all the coal" in and under the surface
of the land with the right to enter and mine without liability and a provision waiving surface support. 152 In another case, a deed conveying the
minerals in, on, and under the property with the right to mine them
gave the mineral owner the right to quarry them.153 This language was
not limited to shaft mining because little reason exists for sinking a shaft
to obtain minerals found on the surface. Thus, the term "mine" may include methods of mining other than shaft mining.154
Where a conveyance made before the development of the strip mining
technology contains a grant of mining rights, there is an argument that
such a grant is broad enough to allow use of an after-discovered, improved mining method. It is arguable, however, that strip mining is not
an improved method because of its tremendously injurious effect. 155

146. Id.
147. Department of Forests 8 Parks v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 250
Md. 125, 242 A.2d 165, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 935 (1968).
148. Id.
149. See pt. II, § C (2) of this comment.
150. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568 (1950).' The court
allowed strip mining even though strip mining was not known when the deed
was made and the grantor obtained his mining rights from a reservation in
the deed.
151. Id.
152. Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa. 390, 102 A.2d 893 (1954).
153. Rudd v. Hayden, 265 Ky. 495, 97 S.W.2d 35 (1936).
154. Id.
155. Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970).
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Moreover, mining rights that were intended to limit, regulate, and govern
methods of underground mining' 56 should not permit the removal and
relocation of the overlying surface. Thus, when the parties contemplated
only deep mining, a grant of mining rights should not be extended to
include mining by an injurious, improved method such as strip mining.10 7
However, no rule of law precludes the mineral owner from using mining

methods that modern machinery and inventions make possible.'0 8

5. Kentucky Broad Form Deeds
The Kentucky courts have been very liberal in permitting strip mining
where the parties failed to mention it in the deed. They have developed
a special rule for the interpretation and construction of broad form deeds,
which were developed in the early 1900's for the acquisition of minerals.
Broad form deeds, which are usually standard forms prepared by the
mineral purchaser, give the mineral purchaser broad and comprehensive
rights. First, he gets the right to remove all the coal in, on, and under the
surface. Second, he gets the right to use the surface in any and every manner that may be necessary or convenient for mining. Finally, he receives
the grantor's complete waiver of rights to any surface damages that the
enjoyment of these mining rights might cause. 10 9
Although the broad form deed neither expressly excludes nor includes strip mining, the Kentucky courts construe it as giving the mineral
owner the right to strip mine.10 0 By looking at all the provisions in the
deed, the courts find that the parties intended the grantor's reserved estate
in the surface to be subservient to the grantee's dominant estate.10 1 Thus,
the mineral owner's right to use the surface is dominant. Furthermore, the
courts consider the conveyance of all the coal to be the principal purpose
156.
157.
158.
Stewart

Oresta v. Romano Bros., 137 W. Va. 633, 73 S.E.2d 622 (1952).
Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970).
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568 (1950), overruled,
v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 266 A.2d 259 (1970).

159. Note, Reclamation of Strip Mine Spoils, 50 KY. L.J. 524, 528 (1962).
In Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40, 41, 42 (Ky. 1956), the broad form deed

severed the minerals and conveyed:
[P]roperty, rights and privileges, in, of, to, on, under, concerning and
appurtenant,... [a]ll the coal, minerals and mineral products.., such
of the standing timber as may be, or by the Grantee, his heirs or representatives, its successors, or assigns, be deemed necessary for mining purposes . . . . [The grantee may] use and operate the same and surface
thereof . . . in any and every manner that may be deemed necessary
or convenient for mining, and therefrom removing . . . and in the use
of said land and surface thereof by the Grantee, his heirs or representatives, successors and assigns, shall be free from, and is, and are, hereby released from liability or claim of damage to the said Grantor ....
160. See Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968);

Croley v. Round Mountain Coal Co., 374 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1964); Blue Diamond

Coal Co. v. Campbell, 371 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1963); Wright v. Bethlehem Minerals
Co., 368 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1963); Ritchie v. Midland Mining Co., 347 S.W.2d
549 (Ky. 1961); Kodak Coal Co. v. Smith, 338 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. 1960); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Neace, 337 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1960); Bevander Coal Co. v.

Matney, 320 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1959).

161. Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
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of the deed. 162 Thus, if strip mining is the only feasible method for removing all the coal, the courts will permit it, even where the parties
contemplated another method when they executed the deed. 163 Thus, the
Kentucky courts consider the mineral owner's right to use the surface
paramount, unless he exercises that right oppressively, arbitrarily, wantonly,
or maliciously. In the latter event, the surface owner may recover his
164
damages.
In Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co.,16 5 there was a strong dissent
to the Kentucky rule. The dissent's major argument was the parties could
not have intended the broad form deed to mean that the mineral owner
could destroy the value of the surface for farming and other purposes.' 66
In answer to this contention, the majority pointed out that farmers and
fields were few when the contracts were made.167 In addition, most of
the landowners received nearly the full value of the land in exchange for
the mineral rights. This indicated that the landowners chose to retain
bare title simply for what little value, if any, it might have. 163
The dissent further pointed out that when most of these deeds were
executed, strip mining was unknown. 69 Because the parties never thought
of strip mining and never dreamed of surface destruction, the grantee
should have no right to strip mine. Moreover, shaft mining was the prevailing form of mining at the time the deeds were made. Thus, the
parties arguably intended to give the grantee a right to use the surface
for any purpose necessary or convenient in shaft or tunnel mining.17 0
Kentucky courts are wrong in failing to distinguish between shaft and
17 1
strip mining, as well as in ignoring all surface owner rights.
Another possible way of reaching a result contrary to that reached by
the Kentucky rule is to apply the normal rule of construction that a deed
should be more strongly construed against the party drafting it. The Kentucky courts, however, fail to realize that the grantees' attorneys prepared
many of these broad form deeds.172 Because the grantee's draftsman caused
the uncertainty to exist, the deeds should be construed against the mineral
owner. 173 Further, it would be a simple matter to include the right to

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1968).
Id. (dissenting opinion).
Id.
Id.

169. Id. (dissenting opinion).

170. Id. (dissenting opinion). The dissent pointed out that before Buchanan
v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956), a long line of cases had held that grantees

under similar broad form deeds had a right to use the surface for any purpose
deemed necessary or convenient by the grantee. All these cases, however, in-

volved deep mining, which was the method of mining contemplated by the parties
in 1905.
171. Id. (dissenting opinion).
172. Comment, Broad Form Deed-Obstacle to Peaceful Co-Existence Between
Mineral and Surface Owners, 60 Ky. L.J. 742, 748-9 (1972).
173. Id. at 749.
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strip mine in the deed. Therefore, the burden of the failure to include
such a provision should fall on the party who prepared the deed.
Ultimately, however, the most important factor supporting the Kentucky position may be one that is not based on the legal considerations
mentioned above. Strip mining of bituminous coal is vital to the wellbeing of the coal industry.174 This economic consideration may be the
1 75
real basis for the Kentucky decisions.
IV.

SURFACE PRESERVATION V. STP

MINING

A. Is the JudicialAttitude Toward Surface Preservation a
DesirablePublic Policy?
Strip mining causes many problems. It destroys the surface, leaving it

useless for agricultural production. The spoil banks from strip mining
present further economic and aesthetic problems. Their steepness creates
a serious erosion problem. They may also initiate land slides and contribute excessive amounts of silt to streams. Many are high in chemicals
that pollute streams after a rainfall. They ruin the aesthetic value of the
land as deep pits and slag heaps are often left in view. Without natural
vegetation, the area becomes a virtual desert for wildlife. Also, the value
of adjoining property may decline. Finally, reclamation, if possible at all,

176
will take many years.
These factors indicate that a desirable public policy supports the
court's general refusal to imply a right to strip mine. Furthermore, because of "the annual increase in the rate of strip mining, the steady increase in the size and capacity of strip mining machinery, and the
enormous amount of coal potentially recoverable by strip mining methods,
strip mining methods pose a clear threat to the future utility and beauty
of land throughout the country." 77
On the other hand, there are considerations favoring strip mining.
The reality of a fuel shortage is one example. With the increased population and use of manufactured products and electrical appliances, there
will be a strong demand for fuels and minerals of all types, especially coal.
Also, strip mining is more economical than shaft mining. In strip mining,
output per man-day is roughly 100 percent higher than in underground
mining, and average recovery is 60 percent higher with 25-30 percent lower
operating expenses. 78 Usually, the value of the coal removed from most
strip mining sites is many times the agricultural value of the land. 70
Thus, the mineral owner may suffer severe financial consequences if he
is unable to get what he bargained for.

174. Note, supra 159, at 525-27.
175. Id. at 529; see Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40, 48-44 (Ky. 1956).
176. U.S.

DEP'T. OF INTERIOR. SURFACE MINING AND OUR ENVIRONMENT,

51-95

(1967).
177. P. AVER=, SRIPINc--Co. REsOURCFS OF T=E UNITED STATs-January
1, 1970, at 25 (U.S. Dep't Int., Geol. Survey Bull. No. 1322, 1970).
178. Id. at 1.
179. Id. at 26.
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B. Possible Solutions for the Conflict
The simplest solution would be to prohibit strip mining and surface mining. This is unrealistic, however, considering the nation's enormous
mineral reserves and increasing demand for fuel. Another possibility
would be to require an express waiver of subjacent support or an express
grant of the right to strip mine before allowing damage to the surface.
Although such a rule could not be retroactive, it could be applicable to
future deeds. If the parties intend to give such destructive rights, they
should do so expressly. It is a simple procedure to include such rights
in the deed. If a provision to strip mine was accidentally left out, the
injured party could seek reformation. Another solution would be to require the mineral owner to own the entire fee before allowing surface
mining. This would only eliminate the harsh consequences to the surface
owner, however. At the least, it is only fair that the surface owner receive
fair compensation for the destruction of the surface unless he expressly

waives that right. Subsidence regulations and reclamation acts may aid
in solving these problems and may also change the common law rules.' 8 0
V. CONCLUSION

In most jurisdictions, the surface owner has a right, unless waived,
to subjacent support. For a waiver, the courts require clear expression or
necessary implication. The right is absolute, and thus there is a presumption against its waiver. The parties' intent governs, and the burden
is on the mineral owner to to show that the parties intended to absolve
him from any damages arising from the removal of the minerals. The
common law right to subjacent support will remain one of the surface
owner's important rights. In addition, some states may enact subsidence
statutes codifying this right.
Similarly, courts will continue to protect the surface owner from
destruction of the surface. Further, most modern courts will continue the
strong presumption against surface mining. For practical purposes, the
courts will allow strip mining only when it is expressly mentioned, because
courts will construe grants, reservations, and circumstances surrounding
the deed against the implication of strip mining. With the added emphasis on the environment and in view of a recent dissenting opinion, the
Kentucky rule implying a right of surface mining from the language in
broad form deeds may be qualified and limited in the future. Outside of
180. See, e.g., 444.500-.755, .760-786, RSMo 1971 Supp. There is strong possibility that Congress will enact laws governing surface mining in the near future.
The House of Representatives passed the Coal Mine Surface Area Protection Act
of 1972, H.R. 6482, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), on October 11, 1972, by a 265
to 75 rollcall vote. This bill authorized the Secretary of Interior to approve or
disapprove permit applications for surface mining. Furthermore, it required that
the Secretary disapprove permits in areas with slopes greater than 20 degrees
unless the operator shows that environmental damage will not result and that
the land is reclaimable. It was said that this provision could shut down half the
mines in the Appalachian Mountains. However, the Senate took no action on
a related bill, Surface Mining Reclamation Act of 1972, S. 630, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972), before adjournment. These bills could change the common law
significantly.
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